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Consider the view that each individual possesses a haecceity: a non-qualitative property the in-
stantiation of which is both necessary and sufficient to be that very individual.1 One reason to 
believe in the existence of haecceities – perhaps the reason, and certainly the most influential – is 
that they are required to explain why any one individual is numerically distinct from another even 
when the two are qualitatively exactly alike, as it is with the pair of iron spheres famously discussed 
by Max Black (1952). According to this line of reasoning, what explains why Black’s iron spheres 
are two in number cannot merely be a difference in their qualitative properties. Rather, it is the fact 
that they possess two different haecceities, the numerical distinctness of which is taken as brute. 
 
Jason Bowers and Meg Wallace (2018) have argued that a Euthyphro-style dilemma arises for 
those who base their belief in haecceities on Black-style considerations. Consider a case of fission 
in which one individual divides into many, such as the familiar one of an amoeba splitting in two 
across a period of time. (Bowers and Wallace discuss an analogous dilemma involving cases of 
fusion, where two individuals combine into one; nothing will turn on differences between the two 
																																																						
1 I should stress that the view in question neither entails nor is entailed by haecceitism, the modal thesis that reality 
could have differed in non-qualitative respects without differing in any qualitative respects. It also takes no stance on 
what type of property a haecceity is, or whether an individual instantiates one or many. See Bowers and Wallace 
(2018: fn. 1) and Cowling (2016: §2) for further overview. All undated parenthetical citations are to Bowers and 
Wallace’s article.      
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dilemmas, so I set this one aside.) Supposing that there are haecceities, then accompanying this 
material change is a further change in how many of them are instantiated: at first there was one, 
and then there are two. If so, then according to Bowers and Wallace, a Euthyphronic question 
arises regarding which change explains which: ‘did the amoeba split in two because two haeccei-
ties came to be instantiated, or did two haecceities come to be instantiated because the amoeba 
split in two?’ (17).    
 
In taking the first horn, Bowers and Wallace argue that it would be ill-advised to say that ‘perfectly 
ordinary physical events are due to obscure changes in purely abstract entities’ (15), for the only 
accounts on offer are underdeveloped at best, and absurd at worst. It is not as though the amoeba’s 
splitting in two results from the amoeba’s haecceity splitting in two. Other accounts of ‘haecceitic 
activity’, such as those due to Plato and Proclus, are similarly dubious (18–20).     
 
In taking the second horn – to say that because of the amoeba’s splitting, two haecceities came to 
be instantiated when there was once just one – Bowers and Wallace argue that this conflicts with 
the Black-style argument for haecceities canvassed earlier. The raison d’être for haecceities is, 
supposedly, to explain numerical diversity among individuals. If so, then according to Bowers and 
Wallace, a problematic explanatory circularity emerges:    
 
The very idea of splitting presupposes numeric diversity. Maude could not have split unless 
doing so resulted in additional individuals. To even say ‘Maude is splitting’ presupposes this 
resultant diversity. If we ask what makes it true that Maude is splitting, as opposed to doing 
something else, like dancing or thinking, part of the answer must cite the fact that more than 
one individual is involved. Maude’s splitting, in other words, is made possible by the phenom-
enon of numeric diversity. (17, emphasis in original) 
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According to Bowers and Wallace, the amoeba’s splitting is at least partly explained by the fact 
that the splitting process began with only one individual, and culminated in the appearance of two. 
This is a fact about a change in how many individuals there are, and thus one that the believer in 
haecceities explains in terms of a change in how many of these are instantiated. But the entire point 
behind grasping the second horn was to say that the amoeba’s splitting explains this change in how 
many haecceities are instantiated, not the other way around. Those who grasp the second horn 
must therefore abandon the classic argument for haecceities ‘[o]n pain of circularity’ (17).  
 
Bowers and Wallace have dubbed this dilemma ‘the Haecceitic Euthyphro’ (15). Yet in fact, the 
dilemma has little to do with haecceities specifically. More or less the same reasoning appears to 
threaten the viability of Platonistic explanations of numerical diversity among individuals more 
generally. Consider the view that it is the possession of certain causally inert, spatially unlocated 
qualitative properties – not haecceities – that explain numerical diversity among individuals. Then 
did the amoeba split in two because two such qualitative properties came to be instantiated, or did 
two of these come to be instantiated because the amoeba split in two? The view in question faces 
the same awkward choice between explanatory obscurity in grasping the first horn, or explanatory 
circularity in grasping the second horn. That the view in question traffics in causally inert, spatially 
unlocated qualitative properties instead of haecceities appears to make little, if any, difference to 
the dilemma’s force. As a case in point, Bowers and Wallace seem to imply that grasping the first 
horn of the Haecceitic Euthyphro would be especially ‘mysterious’, as haecceities ‘contribute 
nothing to the qualitative character of their possessors, so their presence cannot be seen, smelt, or 
directly detected in any way’ (15). But if there is something mysterious here, appealing to causally 
inert and spatially unlocated qualitative properties does little to remove it. It is mysterious how 
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Platonistic entities of any type could be empirically detectable – even qualitative ones – as even 
those sympathetic to Platonism concede (cf. Swoyer 2008: 27).   
 
Likewise, my diagnosis of where Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma goes wrong applies equally well 
to haecceitic and qualitative versions of it, although to keep matters concise I will focus on the 
former (how to extend it to the latter will be obvious). Let us grant to Bowers and Wallace that it 
would be problematic to posit obscure activity among haecceities, or to jettison the traditional 
reason for believing that there are haecceities in the first place. Moreover, let us grant the implicit 
‘chaining’ assumption in the second horn of Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma: if a fact, p, is at least 
partially explained by a fact of numerical diversity, q, which in turn is at least partially explained 
by a fact about haecceities, r, then p is also at least partially explained by r. (Another type of 
response to Bowers and Wallace’s dilemma – one I will not explore here – is to reject this instance 
of the chaining of metaphysical explanations: cf. Schaffer 2012 and Litland 2013 for discussion). 
Even granting all of this, the reasoning underlying the Haecceitic Euthyphro – specifically, the 
argument against taking the second horn – is fallacious, for it rests on an equivocation.  
 
Specifically, Bowers and Wallace say little about how ‘because’, ‘in virtue of’, ‘due to’, ‘results 
from’, and other explanatory language used to set up the dilemma is to be understood, beyond that 
it concerns an atemporal form of dependence ‘easily grasped by professional philosophers and 
undergraduates alike’ (15). Yet there are at least two types of atemporal explanatory dependence 
of relevance to metaphysics, and the Haecceitic Euthyphro arises only by failing to distinguish 
them. In taking the second horn, believers in haecceities explain why there is was a change in the 
number of haecceities instantiated in terms of the amoeba’s splitting. Doing so, however, is entirely 
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compatible with one then explaining what it is for the amoeba to split in terms of a change in the 
number of haecceities instantiated. Since no problematic circularity results when these two types 
of explanatory dependence run in opposite directions – indeed, examples of this ‘circularity’ are 
utterly familiar – it follows that there is no haecceitic Euthyphro problem.             
 
The distinction between metaphysically explaining why a fact holds vs. what it is for it to hold is 
often subsumed under the distinction between stating what grounds a fact vs. what lies in the fact’s 
essence (cf. Fine 2012; 2015). Although I will follow suit, what matters for present purposes is 
that there is such a distinction, regardless of whether one characterizes it in this particular fashion.2 
What I have in mind is simply the difference between specifying what a fact itself at least partially 
‘consists in’ and ‘constitutively involves’ (and thus what is ‘part of its very nature’), as opposed 
to instead specifying the ‘deeper’ facts that non-causally ‘give rise’ to it on a particular occasion. 
Put in this rough and intuitive but recognizable) manner, it is a commonplace that these two ways 
to account for a fact can come apart. Specifying why a particular creature is in a state of conscious-
ness in terms of neurophysiological features of its brain clearly leaves it open what it is for this 
creature to be in this state (is it, for instance, to be in a certain functional state?). And even if 
functionalists correctly specify what it is for this creature to be conscious, why it is conscious on 
																																																						
2 For instance, one might follow Audi (2015), who draws basically the same distinction I do, calling it the distinction 
between explanation and explication. Although Audi denies that explications are explanations, that disagreement be-
tween my view and his need not detain us here. For even Audi grants that ‘in virtue of’, ‘makes it the case that’, and 
other language used to express explanations are often used by philosophers to express explications (2015: 209). Thus, 
those with Audi’s view can rephrase all that I go on to say in terms of two different uses of explanatory language in 
metaphysics (as opposed to two different types of metaphysical explanation) without affecting anything of substance. 
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this particular occasion may well remain wholly opaque absent further (presumably empirical) 
investigation. The point here applies not only to matters of mind, of course: philosophers across 
the discipline are often quick to emphasize whether they aim to propose the one type of metaphys-
ical explanation, or the other (cf. Audi 2015, Greenberg 2014, Skiles 2015, and Sober 1984: 75). 
 
Not only do the two types of metaphysical explanation come apart. Moreover, there are cases in 
which the two run in opposite directions. Far from being an exotic phenomenon, instances of the 
determinable-determinate relation – which are widely treated as textbook cases of metaphysical 
explanation – fit precisely this pattern. In one direction: an individual’s being red, spherical, and 
six kilograms in mass at least partially ground its having colour, shape, and mass (respectively), 
and thus having these determinate properties at least partially explains why it has these determina-
ble properties (cf. Rosen 2010: 126 and Schaffer 2012: 127). Yet in the other direction: it is part 
of the essential nature of an individual’s being red, spherical, and six kilograms in mass that it has 
colour, shape, and mass (respectively), and thus having these determinable properties at least par-
tially explains what it is for it to have these determinate properties (cf. Correia 2006: 756 and 
Dasgupta 2016: 386).3 Similar cases in which these two types of metaphysical explanation run in 
opposite directions involve more contentious matters. For instance, although it is part of what it is 
for multiple things to share a property that they resemble in a respect – indeed, Paul Audi (2013: 
754) calls this a “truism” – realists about universals will nonetheless disagree with resemblance 
																																																						
3` Note that in saying that at least part of what it is for an individual to be red (for example) is for it to be coloured, I 
do not imply that its being red just is its being coloured, nor even that there is some further condition, C, such that its 
being red just is its being both coloured and C (cf. Dasgupta 2016: 386)  
	 7 
nominalists over whether facts about property-sharing ‘give rise’ to resemblances, or vice versa 
(cf. Audi 2015: 210). 
 
Return now to the haecceitic Euthyphro problem. Bowers and Wallace, recall, have argued that 
their best take on cases of fission ensnares believers in haecceities in an explanatory circle. Yet 
the ‘circularity’ involved here is, I claim, nothing more than the seemingly innocuous ‘circularity’ 
displayed in the cases above.  
 
On the one hand, Adams (1979), Rosenkrantz (1993), and originally Duns Scotus – whom Bowers 
and Wallace single out as offering haecceity-based explanations of numerical diversity (19) – more 
or less explicitly treat haecceities as playing a role in explaining what it is for individuals to be 
distinct. Thus Rosenkrantz, in a chapter titled ‘Metaphysical Explanations’, describes himself as 
providing an ‘analysis’ of individuation by appeal to haecceities, where ‘to analyse a concept, C, 
is to explicate C, that is, to enhance one’s understanding of C by explaining what it is for something 
to be an instance of C’ (1993: 73, emphasis in original). Similarly, Adams repeatedly characterizes 
himself as concerned with what the ‘thisness’ of an individual ‘consists in’, and whether each is 
‘analysable into, equivalent with, or even identical to, purely qualitative properties or suchnessess, 
as claimed by Leibniz’ (1979: 10, 20). And for his part, Duns Scotus uses the term ‘haecceity’ to 
refer to an individual’s individuality, not to the factor responsible for an individual’s individuality, 
which he instead refers to as its ‘singular essence’ and repeatedly ties it to Aristotle’s notion of 
essence, which concerns what it is to be a given individual (cf. King 2005). These believers in 
haecceities only explicitly commit to saying that a change in how many haecceities are instantiated 
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helps explain what it is for the amoeba to split, and it is only in this sense that believers in haecce-
ities more generally must commit to the second fact being ‘presupposed’ and ‘made possible’ by 
the first (as Bowers and Wallace put it before: 17).  
 
On the other hand, I see no good reason why believers in haecceities must commit to anything 
other than the claim that the amoeba’s splitting explains why additional haecceities came to be 
instantiated. Indeed, given an analogy that Bowers and Wallace use to illustrate the type of meta-
physical explanation at issue here, this claim is all that believers in haecceities should commit to. 
According to Bowers and Wallace, if the amoeba’s splitting explains the change in how many 
haecceities are instantiated, then this makes the relevant haecceitic change ‘easier to accept’ in the 
same way that treating ‘immaterial mental states … as epiphenomena, or as dependent by-products 
of physical changes’ makes immaterial mental states easier to accept (15, emphasis in original). 
But I know of no epiphenomenalist who claims that part of what it is to be in an immaterial mental 
state involves the neurophysiological states it happens to be a by-product of. Rather, what epiphe-
nomenalists claim is that states of the latter type explain why a creature happens to be in states of 
the former type on a particular occasion. Similarly, believers in haecceities need only maintain that 
the amoeba’s splitting explains why additional haecceities came to be instantiated.4 
 
Figuring out the exact features of metaphysical explanations of the why vs. what is it variety and 
how the two are related is, of course, well beyond what I can hope to accomplish here. For instance, 
																																																						
4 That said, arguably no problematic circularity results even if these two facts what is it-explain each other: cf. Barnes 
(2018), who argues for the possibility of symmetric ontological dependence by pointing to the plausibility of certain 
symmetric essentialist ‘what is it’ statements.    
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one complication relevant to the present discussion comes from Fine (2015: 306-307). Fine claims 
that if grounding and essential connectedness are both ‘determinative’ or ‘constitutive’ relations, 
then X ‘will not in general (and perhaps will never be)’ a ground of Y when Y is part of X’s essence. 
In reply, Fabrice Correia and I (2017) develop an account of grounding and essence that entails 
Fine’s claim, yet we construe this entailment as a problem, due to how intuitive it is to think that 
having a determinable property is both essential to and grounded in having the relevant one of its 
determinates. Fortunately, one of the strategies Correia and I offer for dealing with this problem 
can be employed here: namely, to construe the what is it-explanation in determinable-determinate 
cases as concerning not what it is for it to be the case that a is F (what we call a claim of alethic 
essence), but rather as concerning what it is to be F (what we call a claim of generic essence). 
Similarly, the believer of haecceities can be read as explaining not what it is for the amoeba to be 
splitting, but rather as explaining what it is to be splitting. Seen in this light, the explanans of the 
haecceity believer’s what is it-explanation is not even the same as the explanandum of their why-
explanation, and thus Bowers and Wallace’s circularity charge is undermined from the start. Of 
course, though, whether this complication must be bothered with in the first place hinges on a more 
extensive discussion of Correia and my dispute with Fine than I can engage in here.        
 
Rather, my goal in this article has been more modest. I have attempted to show that cases where 
the two varieties of metaphysical explanation at least appear to run in opposite directions are nor-
mal and unobjectionable (or at least can be construed in such a way, apropos the above). I then 
attempted to show that the metaphysical explanations that believers in haecceities would presum-
ably offer in cases of fission are just a specific instance of this apparently normal and unobjection-
able more general phenomenon. Since belief in haecceities involves no explanatory circularity – 
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or at any rate, certainly not one that is ‘repugnant to the intellect’ (21), as Bowers and Wallace 
charge – I conclude that there is no haecceitic Euthyphro problem.5  
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